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NEXT STEPS IN NEW YORK NEGOTIATIONS

1. For the next several days, we should continue on our present course to get Soviet assurances that the IL-28's will be withdrawn within a limited period of time, and that we would then be prepared to lift the quarantine.

2. At the Sunday McCloy-Kuznetsov meeting, former should indicate kind of non-invasion pledge we would be willing to make based on the following assumptions: (a) removal of IL-28's within a limited period; (b) Soviet assurance that all nuclear components, warheads and nuclear aerial bombs had been removed; and (c) Soviet assurances against reintroduction of offensive weapons. McCloy would (a) make contingent statement on non-invasion along lines attached draft ~~[Chayes draft]~~; (b) make clear that in absence UN on-site inspection, we intend continue OAS aerial surveillance; and (c) since foregoing would provide opportunity avoid US-USSR military confrontation in Cuba, Soviets should take steps to make sure anti-aircraft equipment under their control remains quiet.

3. FYI There are distinct advantages to closing out this phase of negotiations with Soviets some time next week. It would give Soviets opportunity to disengage from Cubans under conditions that would (a) enable us to pressure them on matters which were not part of original understanding between President and Khrushchev such as remaining Soviet military presence in Cuba; and (b) enable us simultaneously to seek progress on wider subjects (nuclear testing).

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testing, Berlin, disarmament, election of the Secretary General).

4. We would make clear, both to Soviets and to general public, that Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding was never properly fulfilled, and absence of on-site verification and of longer-term safeguards against reintroduction makes it necessary for OAS to retain full freedom of action as regards aerial surveillance and other means of keeping a close eye on Cuban behavior and any evidence of renewed Soviet intrusion into Hemisphere. We would continue to remind world that declaration of intention must be independently checked in a world still so full of international mistrust, which has just been treated to a classic example of large-scale duplicity. We would continue to reject concept that on "one-shot verification" of weapons withdrawal there is any case whatever for reciprocity or ^{RECIPROCITY} ~~mutuality~~; the problem arose in Cuba, and the inspection has to take place in Cuba.

5. Soviet-Cuban protocol is obviously unacceptable; it drags in many elements that were not part of Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding and depends entirely on trustful good faith for its implementation. Soviets can be told that while it may have been necessary for them to co-sign this curious document in order get Mikoyan out of Cuba with whole skin, they can hardly expect us or anybody else in world to take it seriously.

6. We will thus be closing out this phase at this time with no illusions that deal was wholly fulfilled, and with provisos

[REDACTED] attached

attached to our non-invasion pledge that are directly the result of the inability (or, more likely, the unwillingness) of Soviets to induce even a minimum of Cuban cooperation on verification and safeguards. Soviets must clearly understand that if Cubans don't behave, or if Soviets continue their military ~~intension~~ ^{INTRUSION} into Hemisphere, all bets are off, non-invasion pledge becomes dead letter, and other measures (such as renewed and more stringent quarantine) might become necessary.

END FYI

7. Within this framework, we would favor an SC meeting during this next week at which following steps would be taken:

- (a) The SYG would report on the steps he has taken, and in particular his series of unsuccessful efforts to secure Cuban agreement to UN on-site inspection to verify withdrawal and dismantling of offensive weapons and to safeguard against future reintroduction.
 - (b) The USSR would make a declaration indicating steps it has taken pursuant to the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and containing assurances that all nuclear components have been removed, that the IL-28's would come out by a given date and that no offensive weapons would be reintroduced in Cuba in the future.
 - (c) The United States would make a parallel declaration
- (1) taking note of the Soviet assurances cited above;

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- (2) indicating that we have lifted the quarantine;
- (3) giving assurance against invasion (and against support for invasion from our shores) with whatever conditionality we decide to attach; and (4) reiterating US intent seek cooperation of LA's with respect to assurances against invasion.

These declarations would be noted by the Security Council President in a "summation" which would have to be agreed ahead of time. Alternatively a brief procedural resolution noting the declarations might be less difficult to achieve than getting UAR to agree to an acceptable summation. If a resolution is used, it should contain no substantive elements and should establish no continuing machinery.

changes in frequency, procedures etc be manipulated to stir up contention in Soviet Cuban relations.

Continued tension would tend to maximize the economic burden of Soviet aid to Cuba. Moscow would find itself in more frequent need to bribe the Cubans as disputes on other issues continued. At the same time there would be less possibility of Cuban trade with the free-world, and the burden of maintaining Cuba would fall exclusively to the bloc.

If Soviet-Cuban differences continued, Peiping would almost certainly wish to exploit them and the Cubans might seek to play off Moscow and Peiping.

At the same time the utility of Cuba to the USSR would diminish. Under the constant threat of US counteraction Moscow would have to be more circumspect about attempting to use Cuba either as a base for Soviet military forces or as a staging area for subversion in Latin America.

If the Soviets found themselves sufficiently uncomfortable in Cuba, and the utility of their remaining declined, the Soviet Union might at some future point decide that the game was no longer worth the candle, though that result cannot be assured by the simple expedient of perpetuating a chronic crisis.

Effect on US-Soviet Relations

At first glance it might seem that continued tension over Cuba would not be conducive to negotiations on other issues. Obviously, Moscow would prefer a more secure toehold in Cuba, and the Soviet Union might at some early point wish to show its displeasure by putting off some negotiations in which it had only a limited interest in order to make a point of alleged US bad faith.

But Moscow has important interests to be served by negotiations with the West (in many instances this is true even of negotiations which the USSR does not expect will eventuate in any agreements), and the Soviets will not long allow potential diplomatic advantages to be wasted for the sake of interests which are more Castro's than the Soviet Union's. And if Moscow has in fact made a fundamental and radical reappraisal of the desirability of far-reaching settlements with the West (which we doubt), the USSR would be all the more impatient to get down to negotiations.

Whatever Moscow's aspirations for agreements with the West may be, continuation of a simmering crisis over Cuba would impel the Soviets toward creating an atmosphere of detente, and giving at least an appearance of being forthcoming in negotiations. For so long as the threat of further US moves against Cuba remains, the Soviets will have a motive for attempting to maintain a political climate in which the US might be inhibited from taking action.